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It is not yet clear when, or on what terms, the UK will leave the EU. By 31 October 2019, the UK must decide to ratify an exit treaty, 
request a further extension, cancel Brexit or opt 
for a no-deal departure. In the latter scenario, 
it will depart without a formal agreement on 
its future relationship with its EU security and 
defence partners. Deal or no deal, there will be 
consequences for British and European cyber 
security, as discussed in this article. Cyber 
security – the technology, processes and controls 
supporting the protection of computer systems, 
networks, devices and data from subversion, theft 
or damage – has not been a major topic in Brexit 
discussions, either diplomatically or in the public 
domain. Indeed, given its crucial role in furthering 
economic prosperity and political stability, it feels 
rather overlooked. 
It may be that parties to the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU are relatively sanguine about the 
limited effects of Brexit on cyber security. For 
instance, the chief executive of the UK National 
Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), Ciaran Martin, 
has suggested that many UK–EU cyber security 
relationships have little or nothing to do with the 
EU as such. They instead rely on other bilateral 
and multilateral frameworks.1 While this is true – 
for example, intelligence is shared with Five Eyes 
partners and NATO Allies – it should not mask 
the potentially deleterious effects of Brexit on 
other aspects of cyber security contingent on the 
EU. The UK’s cyber security relationships with 
the EU are at least as complex as any comparable 
defence arrangements under the Common 
Security and Defence Policy: many cyber security 
1. Vivienne Clarke, ‘Brexit “Will Not Impact” UK-EU Co-operation on Cybersecurity’, Irish Times, 1 November 2018.
competences fall across multiple fields of security, 
policing, justice and defence. Moreover, as 
bilateral arrangements with EU members may at 
some juncture be subject to the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), the relationship 
with the EU will have continuing relevance.
This article addresses a range of factors that 
should be considered when negotiating the cyber 
security components of a future UK–EU security 
treaty (or treaties) under any form of Brexit. This 
is particularly important in the event of a no-deal 
Brexit, as neither the UK nor the EU will be working 
from an agreed understanding of their defence, 
policing and security priorities and obligations – 
including those concerning cyber security. This 
article cannot provide an exhaustive analysis 
of the possible post-Brexit settlement of cyber 
security cooperation between the UK and the EU. 
Instead, it seeks to focus on the post-Brexit cyber 
security landscape more than existing EU cyber 
security frameworks. The first section suggests 
that the UK and Europe are working from positions 
of relative strength in cyber security, although 
this is not grounds for complacency. Subsequent 
sections address issues connected to intelligence 
sharing, cybercrime, and being ‘outside the room’ 
of EU cyber security decision-making. The article 
concludes with a call to address cyber security as 
a strategic priority in any future post-Brexit treaty 
negotiations between the UK and the EU. The 
conclusion is that there are reasons to be positive 
about future UK–EU cyber security cooperation, 
but this should not obscure the need for urgent and 
timely interventions on a range of practical and 
political cyber security issues.
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Brexit is likely to have an effect on UK–EU cyber security cooperation. While there are ongoing reasons 
to be positive about the state of UK–EU cyber security, Tim Stevens and Kevin O’Brien show how Brexit 
will have negative impacts on cybercrime policing and cyber threat intelligence sharing, particularly in a 
‘no-deal’ scenario, and argue that the absence of a negotiated settlement will damage the cyber security 
of the UK and the EU.
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In the first instance, it should be recognised that the 
UK is in a relatively strong position in terms of its own 
attitudes and commitments to cyber security. Cyber 
security will remain a Tier One priority for the UK, 
as set out in the 2015 National Security Strategy and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review.2 Preparations 
are already underway for the fourth iteration of the 
National Cyber Security Strategy, following earlier 
versions in 2009, 2011 and 2016.3 Government 
investment in cyber security has been sustained, 
the most recent tranche being the £1.9-billion 
five-year investment programme announced in 2016.4 
The founding of the NCSC has been a welcome 
addition to the UK cyber security landscape and 
allows for a greater range of proactive public–private 
interactions than ever.5 The NCSC is a hub around 
which multiple other industry, education, standards 
2. HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous 
United Kingdom (SDSR 2015), Cm 9161 (London: The Stationery Office, 2015).
3. Cabinet Office, ‘National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021: Progress Report’, May 2019, p. 22.
4. HM Government, ‘National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021’, November 2016.
5. National Cyber Security Centre, ‘The National Cyber Security Centre’, <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/>, accessed 18 June 2019.
6. Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘GDPR and NIS’, <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/the-guide-to-nis/gdpr-and-nis/>, 
accessed 18 June 2019. 
7. RSM, ‘UK Cyber Security Sectoral Analysis and Deep-Dive Review’, June 2018.
8. Gavin Jackson, ‘Why Investment by UK Companies Continues to Fall’, Financial Times, 7 January 2019.
9. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, ‘Cyber Security Skills and the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure’, 
Second Report of Session 2017-19, HL Paper 172 / HC 706, July 2018. The report notes a shortage of 15–30% of required 
positions in the field; a mere 10% of those positions are filled by women.
10. William Crumpler and James A Lewis, ‘The Cybersecurity Workforce Gap’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
January 2019. The report suggests that 82% of employers reported a shortfall in cyber security skills, while 71% believe the 
and technical initiatives gravitate and is widely 
considered a potential model for other countries 
to emulate. The UK has also adopted new data 
protection and critical infrastructure regulations 
that will improve cyber security and consumer 
confidence.6 On the commercial side, the UK has 
a vibrant and innovative cyber security industry 
worth at least £5.7 billion a year, and which works in 
partnership with government to deliver its strategic 
objectives.7 Concerns abound, however, as to how 
this industry could be negatively impacted by any 
form of Brexit – especially a no-deal one – due to 
tangible evidence of lowering investments in the UK 
by corporations,8 and a reduction in the number of 
cyber security professionals coming from the rest of 
the world to work in the UK.9 This is at a time when 
there is already insufficient cyber security talent to 
meet global demand,10 and when actual investment 
After Brexit, the UK wants to be more than just a visitor 
to Europol, one of the EU's key agencies coordinating 
action against cybercrime. Courtesy of PA Images/Yuriko 
Nakao
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in cyber security services by British companies is, on 
the whole, rising year on year.11 The overall picture 
is one in which UK companies are increasing their 
demand for cyber security skills in a severely tight 
labour market for those skills, a significant percentage 
of which are sourced from the global market, which 
is itself already facing a deepening cyber security 
skills shortage.
At the international level, the UK has also 
demonstrated its willingness to engage with external 
partners in the form of intelligence sharing, norms 
promotion, and diplomacy around attribution of 
cyber operations to foreign actors. The Attorney 
General’s Chatham House speech of May 2018 
was well-received internationally, as it set out in 
measured and principled fashion the UK’s continuing 
commitment to the rule of international law in 
cyberspace.12 These ambitions were demonstrated 
in practical terms by the UK’s public attribution, 
in coordination with security partners, of cyber 
operations to Russian military intelligence in late 
2018.13 The UK’s consistency in this respect suggests 
that it is developing a coherent approach to both 
theory and practice across a number of policy areas 
that pertain to state behaviours in cyberspace, not 
least in the diplomatic domain. 
The UK takes seriously its relationships with its EU 
partners and senior British officials have expressed 
their confidence that Brexit will not materially affect 
UK–EU cyber security cooperation.14 Institutions 
like the NCSC have received ‘clear instruction’ from 
the Cabinet Office to ‘cooperate unconditionally on 
European security’.15 Cyber security received specific 
talent gap causes direct and measurable damage to their organisations. The number of unfilled cyber security positions has 
risen by more than 50% since 2015. 
11. RSM, ‘UK Cyber Security Sectoral Analysis and Deep-Dive Review’.
12. Jeremy Wright, ‘Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century’, speech given in London, 23 May 2018, <https://
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century>, accessed 18 June 2019. For an 
informed reaction to this speech, see Matthew Waxman, ‘U.K. Outlines Position on Cyberattacks and International Law’, 
Lawfare, 23 May 2018.
13. Foreign Office, ‘UK Exposes Russian Cyber Attacks’, press release, 4 October 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
uk-exposes-russian-cyber-attacks>, accessed 18 June 2019. 
14. Warwick Ashford, ‘UK Committed to Working with EU Cyber Security Partners’, Computer Weekly, 21 February 2019. 
15. Clarke, ‘Brexit “Will Not Impact” UK-EU Co-operation on Cybersecurity’.
16. ‘Political Declaration Setting Out the Framework for the Future Relationship Between the European Union and the United 
Kingdom’, 22 November 2018, ss. 110–13.
17. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), ‘NIS Directive’, <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/
topics/nis-directive>, accessed 18 June 2019. 
18. Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Security of Network and Information Systems: Guidance for Competent 
Authorities’, April 2018.
19. Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) Network consists of EU member states’ formally appointed national 
CSIRTs and CERT-EU. For more details, see ENISA, ‘CSIRTs Network’, <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-
europe/csirts-network>, accessed 18 June 2019.
20. HM Government, ‘National Security Capability Review’, March 2018, pp. 21–22.
attention in the Political Declaration of November 
2018, identifying cooperation in cyber threat 
intelligence-sharing and continued partnerships 
with key EU cyber security institutions as strategic 
priorities for both parties.16 However, it is not 
legally binding and will be irrelevant in the case of 
no deal. Other structures will continue. The April 
2018 transposition into UK law of the EU Directive 
on Security of Network and Information Systems 
(NIS Directive) is a crucial aspect of both UK cyber 
security and EU cyber resilience strategy and will 
persist after Brexit, with or without a deal. The NIS 
Directive regulates and incentivises national cyber 
security capabilities and critical infrastructure cyber 
security.17 In the UK, all essential sectors – such as 
water, energy, finance, health and transport – now 
have an established Competent Authority (CA), 
responsible for the oversight and enforcement of 
improved cyber security measures and reporting.18 
In the event of preventable cyber security incidents 
leading to serious adverse effects on essential services, 
the CAs are authorised to levy large fines from 
offending service operators. Moreover, it encourages 
transnational collaboration, including through the 
NIS Cooperation Group and the Computer Security 
Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) Network.19 
Government has reaffirmed many of these 
ambitions and initiatives in subsequent statements 
and more formally in the 2018 National Security 
Capability Review.20 None of these attributes and 
aspirations are likely to be greatly affected by Brexit, 
nor are they grounds for complacency. Indeed, 
there are already a number of issues and concerns 
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confronting the UK’s approach to cyber security 
irrespective of Brexit. Recent public statements by 
government officials over Huawei and 5G supply-chain 
security indicate the complex interdependencies of 
telecommunications policy, industrial investment 
and geopolitics.21 Others have suggested that the 
UK government’s approach to Huawei, specifically, 
is ‘at best naive, at worst irresponsible’.22 This may 
be one clear area of divergence from EU partners, 
as the UK, Germany, France, Italy and other leading 
EU countries have each yet to settle on a consistent 
approach on whether to allow Huawei to participate 
in their 5G build-outs, in the face of similar bans 
enacted recently in the US and Australia.23 
As noted above, warnings continue about a cyber 
security skills shortage in the UK.24 At least one 
parliamentary committee has called into question 
an apparent lack of cyber security leadership at 
the heart of government.25 Worryingly, the National 
Audit Office’s February 2019 assessment of the 
current National Cyber Security Programme finds 
that the UK government is unlikely to deliver on most 
of its stated strategic outcomes by 2021.26 Some, or 
indeed all, of these could have an impact on the UK’s 
future cyber security relationships with the EU. And, 
notwithstanding warm words to the contrary, there 
are other problems ahead in the way that the EU and 
the UK interact on cyber security issues.
Cyber Threat Intelligence 
Cyber security is an inherently transnational 
endeavour, given the nature of the internet and 
other information networks which sprawl across 
21. David Bond, ‘Huawei Threat Uncovers Enemy Within UK Spy Agencies’, Financial Times, 1 March 2019.
22. Charles Parton, ‘China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference?’, RUSI Occasional 
Papers (February 2019), p. 26. See also Bob Seely, Peter Varnish and John Hemmings, ‘Defending Our Data: Huawei, 5G and 
the Five Eyes’, Henry Jackson Society, London, May 2019.
23. Julian E Barnes and Adam Satariano, ‘U.S. Campaign to Ban Huawei Overseas Stumbles as Allies Resist’, New York Times, 
17 March 2019; Jeanne Whalen and Griff White, ‘U.S. Blacklisting of Huawei Prompts European Firms to Follow Suit’, 
Washington Post, 22 May 2019.
24. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, ‘Cyber Security Skills and the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure’.
25. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, ‘Cyber Security of the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure’, Third 
Report of Session 2017–19, HL Paper 222 / HC 1708, November 2018, ss. 79–81.
26. National Audit Office, Progress of the 2016–2021 National Cyber Security Programme, HC 1988 (London: National 
Audit Office, 2019).
27. For an example of cyber threat intelligence production and consumption, see Bank of England, ‘CBEST Intelligence-Led 
Testing: Understanding Cyber Threat Intelligence Operations’, version 2.0, 2016. 
28. ‘Political Declaration Setting Out the Framework for the Future Relationship Between the European Union and the United 
Kingdom’, s. 105.
29. CERT-EU, ‘RFC 2350’, 25 January 2019, <http://cert.europa.eu/static/RFC2350/RFC2350.pdf>, accessed 18 June 2019. 
30. See European Government CERTs Group, ‘European Government CERTs (EGC) Group’, <http://www.egc-group.org/>, 
accessed 18 June 2019; Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, <https://www.first.org/>, accessed 18 June 2019.
multiple jurisdictions and regulatory boundaries. 
Effective cyber security is therefore contingent 
on the exchange of high-quality cyber threat 
intelligence (CTI) – and consequent remediation 
and mitigation actions – between key stakeholders, 
which include government security and intelligence 
agencies, cyber security firms, organisations like 
computer emergency response teams (CERTs), and a 
range of other concerned actors. CTI data is mostly 
derived from open sources and need not be secret in 
origin, although may be augmented with intelligence 
on pronounced cyber actors gained from covert 
sources as appropriate.27 Effective use of CTI gives 
organisations a clear picture of the cyber threat 
landscape, enabling them to prevent, deter, or, at the 
very least, prepare for future adversarial operations. 
This is recognised in the Political Declaration, which 
identifies ‘cyber-threats’ as a specific reason for 
‘timely and voluntary’ exchanges of intelligence.28
One of the key EU mechanisms for the sharing of 
CTI is CERT-EU, based in Brussels. Its core mission 
is to help secure EU institutions’ information and 
communications systems, including through sharing 
CTI with member-states’ CERTs and specialist 
information security firms.29 It is unclear what form 
the UK’s continued interactions with CERT-EU 
will take in the event of Brexit, as it will not have 
automatic access to the data of any EU institution, 
CERT-EU included. Like Norway and Switzerland, 
neither of which is a member of the EU, the NCSC 
is already a member of the non-EU European 
Government CERTs (EGC) group and the global 
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams. 
These organisations focus beyond the EU institutions 
that are within CERT-EU’s purview.30 The UK may 
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look to the EGC for greater cyber information sharing 
– but the EGC is an informal club of only 12 (plus 
CERT-EU), in contrast to the CERT-EU membership 
of 27. The Political Declaration affirmed each 
party’s commitments to ‘security and stability in 
cyberspace’, the need to share intelligence products 
and to cooperate in efforts against cyber threats, 
and the desirability of continued UK involvement 
in CERT-EU and the EU Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA).31 These are admirable 
and necessary ambitions but have no legal effect in 
the absence of a negotiated settlement, nor is there 
any precision or clarity over how these outcomes 
might be achieved. All the more reason, therefore, 
that they should be part of any future negotiations 
over cyber security. 
The UK will therefore become a ‘third country’ in 
most post-Brexit scenarios, unless it can negotiate an 
alternative status before 31 October 2019. There is a 
historical precedent: the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam 
afforded the UK, by virtue of its then-status as an 
EU member, access to Schengen Area cooperative 
frameworks, including the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) security and law enforcement database 
maintained under the auspices of the European 
Commission. Unlike Norway and Switzerland, the 
UK cannot fall back on Schengen membership should 
it withdraw from the EU; Brexit therefore threatens 
its SIS access.32 Similarly, if the UK wants access to 
CERT-EU data, particularly in a no-deal situation, 
it would have to negotiate that access, but from a 
significantly weakened negotiating position. At that 
point, it will be outside the EU and excluded from 
EU agenda-setting and decision-making processes. 
As such, it may be forced to accept EU priorities and 
stipulations that would not have arisen otherwise, 
including being bound, at least to a degree, by 
the decisions of the ECJ as a condition of ‘doing 
business’ with the EU. It is undoubtedly the case that 
the EU would prefer to be able to share CTI with 
the UK through existing frameworks because the UK 
is a substantial producer of CTI and a major cyber 
security player in its own right, but the UK cannot 
rely solely on its relative strengths to incentivise the 
31. ‘Political Declaration Setting Out the Framework for the Future Relationship Between the European Union and the United 
Kingdom’, ss. 110–13.
32. Alexander Babuta, ‘No Deal, No Data? The Future of UK–EU Law Enforcement Information Sharing’, RUSI Briefing 
Paper, February 2019.
33. HM Government, EU Exit: Assessment of the Security Partnership, Cm 9743 (London: The Stationery Office, 2018), p. 25.
34. Hartmut Aden, ‘Information Sharing, Secrecy and Trust Among Law Enforcement and Secret Service Institutions in the 
European Union’, West European Politics (Vol. 41, No. 4, June 2018), pp. 981–1002.
35. Ewen MacAskill, ‘MI5 Chief: UK and EU Intelligence Sharing “Never More Important”’, The Guardian, 13 May 2018.
36. Ibid.
37. See, for instance, Foreign Office, ‘UK Exposes Russian Cyber Attacks’.
creation of future information-sharing arrangements. 
By the government’s own admission, in a no-deal 
scenario ‘the ability to cooperate on cyber with 
the EU would be less certain and would depend on 
the continued willingness of all partners to share 
information, exchange best practice and work 
together to identify evolving threats’.33 While true, 
this is not an exhaustive list of requisite foundations 
for cooperation, not least of which must include the 
existence of a treaty enabling cooperation in law, 
rather than on the basis of aspirations alone. 
Brexit will affect some forms of CTI, but not 
all; it will also not affect many other strategic and 
operational intelligence-sharing arrangements 
existing alongside those covering CTI. The EU has 
access to formal intelligence-sharing mechanisms – 
in the Club de Berne voluntary intelligence-sharing 
forum, which includes the EU member states’ 
intelligence agencies and the EU Intelligence and 
Situation Centre of the EU External Action Service 
– but these have often been accused of being 
ineffective, largely due to mistrust between national 
intelligence agencies.34 The Counter Terrorism 
Group of EU countries and others has been a notable 
success, and the UK is expected to remain part of 
it, but it is not an EU institution.35 In 2018, Director 
General of the Security Service (MI5) Andrew Parker 
drew attention to the need to deepen relations 
between British and other European intelligence 
agencies, presumably as an attempt to forestall 
concerns over Brexit.36 Brexit will not immediately 
affect how the UK shares most intelligence with 
European partners, as it can do so through existing 
or new relationships (such as NATO, bilateral) with 
no basis in EU law or institutions. Sometimes this 
will have a cyber component: the recent public 
attribution of cyber incidents demonstrates this in 
action, as the UK and other countries, including in 
the EU, banded together in various configurations 
to identify the perpetrators.37 European countries 
will want to maintain those relationships, as UK 
intelligence is highly regarded abroad. So too are its 
deep links with US intelligence structures, although 
UK intelligence chiefs have made it plain that they 
© The Author(s) April 2019
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oppose any attempts to make intelligence-sharing a 
bargaining chip in EU–UK negotiations.38 
Cybercrime
In one specific area of intelligence and security 
cooperation, Brexit may have serious and undesirable 
effects. In terms of volume, by far the biggest cyber 
security challenge is cybercrime and Brexit will 
impact the UK’s policing and judicial counter-
cybercrime capacities.39 Europol, its subsidiary 
the European Cybercrime Centre, and Eurojust 
are important forums for EU–UK cybercrime 
cooperation. Europol’s Secure Information Exchange 
Network Application and Europol Information 
System platforms have become invaluable tools 
for secure and rapid exchange of sensitive data for 
European law enforcement, including the National 
Crime Agency and other forces in the UK. The UK 
– with Germany – is the highest contributor of 
information to various Europol intelligence projects, 
including cyber security.40 It also often leads on 
Europol operations and a Briton, Rob Wainwright, 
was director of Europol between 2009 and 2018.
In a no-deal situation, the UK will relinquish 
membership of these agencies and access to their 
intelligence platforms will be seriously disrupted, 
based on how EU law – in the development of which 
the UK played its part – operates. This would affect 
all institutional frameworks and structures with a 
basis in EU law, like Europol and Eurojust. In the 
case of a no deal, the UK would become overnight a 
‘third country’ with respect to EU mechanisms and 
would be excluded a priori from information-sharing 
38. Ewen MacAskill, ‘Using Security as Brexit Bargaining Chip is Reckless and Lacks Credibility’, The Guardian, 30 March 2017.
39. For a survey of UK cybercrime, see National Cyber Security Centre and National Crime Agency, ‘The Cyber Threat to UK 
Business: 2017-2018 Report’, April 2018.
40. Matthew Horne, ‘Written Evidence Submitted by the National Crime Agency (PSC0009)’, <http://data.parliament.uk/
writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/home-office-delivery-of-brexit-
policing-and-security-cooperation/written/78338.pdf>, accessed 18 June 2019.
41. Babuta, ‘No Deal, No Data?’.
42. ‘Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and 
the European Atomic Energy Community’, Article 8.
43. Robert Wright, ‘Europol Head Warns of Security “Impediments” after Brexit’, Financial Times, 7 March 2018.
44. Europol, ‘Operational Agreements’, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/partners-agreements/operational-agreements>, 
accessed 18 June 2019.
45. HM Government, ‘Technical Note: Security, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice’, pp. 2–7, <https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/710802/FINAL_INTERNAL_SECURITY_
COMBINED.pdf>, accessed 18 June 2019. 
46. Theresa May, ‘PM Speech at Munich Security Conference: 17 February 2018’, 17 February 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-february-2018>, accessed 18 June 2019. 
47. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘UK-EU Security Cooperation after Brexit’, Fourth Report of Session 
2017–19, HC 635, March 2018, ss. 34–54.
arrangements, including key policing databases.41 
UK police cannot assume continued access to EU 
databases on an ad hoc or de facto basis after Brexit: 
Article 8 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement clearly 
states that the UK must ensure ‘it does not access a 
network, information system or database which it is 
no longer entitled to access’.42
Former Europol Director Wainwright 
acknowledged while still in post that the UK would 
face ‘impediments’ to information sharing after 
Brexit.43 This is perhaps a diplomatic understatement, 
as it is unclear on what grounds the UK could reach 
an agreement on information sharing with Europol 
if a deal cannot be reached before the UK leaves 
the EU. It will not be a full member, being outside 
the EU, and would have to broker a third-country 
‘operational agreement’ with Europol.44 The UK 
government has indicated that no third-country 
precedent satisfies its ambitions.45 It might be 
possible to negotiate a Denmark-style agreement, 
which is in the EU but not in Europol, but this would 
require the UK to accept the jurisdiction of the ECJ. 
This would be unacceptable to many pro-Brexit 
members of parliament, but outgoing Prime Minister 
Theresa May indicated her willingness to accept 
the remit of the ECJ in this particular instance if it 
means retaining some of the benefits of membership 
in Europol and other EU agencies.46 It is unclear if 
the post-May government will adhere even to this 
minimal concession with respect to the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ over UK affairs. There still exists the 
possibility for a ‘bespoke’ arrangement with Europol, 
but all likely scenarios see the UK relegated from the 
core to the periphery of Europol operations and 
leadership.47 
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It is hard to find any British or European 
commentators who relish this prospect. At present, 
only EU countries are allocated a voting place on 
the Europol Management Board and a non-EU UK 
would presumably be therefore excluded. British 
suggestions for a bespoke arrangement, such as by 
the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 
propose that the UK retain its place on the board ‘with 
a formal say in the strategic priorities and direction 
of the agency’.48 At first blush, it is hard to imagine 
the EU acceding to this but the committee justifies 
this proposal because it reflects ‘the UK’s leadership 
role in [Europol] since 2009, and its world-leading 
strength in policing and intelligence’.49 There is at 
present no treaty mechanism to allow this to happen 
and it would require a European Council decision 
to amend facilitating legislation. The obstacle is 
therefore not so much legal as political, and it 
remains to be seen whether this British argument 
can persuade the Council, especially as not all in the 
EU accept the claims that the UK is a net security 
contributor.50 Without it or something similar, the 
UK’s capacity to tackle cybercrime and many other 
issues will be diminished over the short-to-medium 
term. Notably, the EU will be affected similarly.
Outside the Room?
This situation points to one of the more vexing 
aspects of Brexit. If the UK leaves the EU, 
particularly if no deal is reached, it will effectively 
relinquish its capacity to shape EU policy and 
strategy in multiple fields, including cyber security. 
Its negotiating leverage as a third country will 
be limited and its ability to contribute to internal 
EU defence and security debates will be severely 
restricted. Diplomacy will continue and the UK will 
still be a member of other European institutions, 
like the Council of Europe and the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but 
48. Ibid., s. 53.
49. Ibid.
50. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘UK-EU Security Cooperation after Brexit: Follow-up Report’, Seventh 
Report of Session 2017–19, HC 1356, ss. 34–35.
51. House of Lords European Union Committee, ‘Brexit: The Proposed UK-EU Security Treaty’, 18th Report of Session 
2017–19, HL Paper 164, s. 69.
52. European Commission, ‘EU Negotiators Agree on Strengthening Europe’s Cybersecurity’, press release, 10 December 2018, 
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it will not be a leading member of the EU as it is 
now. The House of Lords has noted with concern 
the implications of being ‘outside the room’ of 
security decision-making.51 In the absence of treaty 
mechanisms that outline specific arrangements to 
the contrary, the UK will, as outlined above, de jure 
be a third-party state to many of the cyber security 
arrangements in which it presently plays a shaping, 
if not leading, role. Options are possible that would 
enable the UK to participate in these institutions, 
but there is no reason to assume these will be as 
beneficial to the UK as before Brexit.
This break will occur just when both the EU 
and the UK are making important steps forward 
in cyber security. ENISA is in an expansion phase, 
with a permanent legal mandate probable in 2020, 
and will play a greater role in cross-EU cyber 
security coordination and certification, backed by 
higher levels of funding and resources.52 The UK is 
capitalising on increased government investment 
in cyber security and, through the NCSC and its 
programme of work, has revised how it interacts 
with cyber security stakeholders, an approach that 
seems to be bearing fruit.53 The UK’s Active Cyber 
Defence programme, for example, is a suite of 
technical initiatives that brings together public and 
private entities to tackle cybercrime in the UK and, 
potentially, elsewhere.54 The UK and the EU have 
found new ways of working together, albeit with 
the UK as a full member state. The incorporation 
into UK law of the NIS Directive, for instance, is an 
important regulatory move towards incentivising 
better cyber security in critical infrastructure 
systems.55 This is not to suggest that either body has 
‘cracked’ the cyber security nut – no one has – but 
each is engaging with cyber security, and with each 
other, in robust and productive fashion. 
Following Brexit, each party will find it that 
much harder to work with the other, although one 
should not discount the high levels of trust that 
pertain in information security and transnational 
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policing communities as a mitigating factor. It will 
be impossible for the UK to remain a member of 
the NIS Cooperation Group or the CSIRTs Network 
without a legal foundation, or to have a formal role 
in the determination of future changes in EU cyber 
security or data protection regulation. The UK is 
compliant with the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016, but what arrangements will be 
forthcoming for ensuring compliance, upon which 
UK–EU trade in services may well depend, should 
EU regulations change in the future? Lessons 
will doubtless have to be learned from EU data 
protection agreements with other third countries, 
such as the recent ‘adequacy’ decisions for Japan, 
Switzerland, the US and others.56 In these cases, 
the European Commission has determined that 
non-EU countries satisfy EU data protection 
requirements, thereby allowing the transfer of EU 
personal data to and from those third countries.
However, as senior officials past and present 
have correctly noted, the UK is not as reliant on 
the EU for cyber security purposes as some might 
think. The UK is an important member of NATO, 
which has its own cyber security objectives, 
although these are more ‘defence’-oriented than 
those of the EU. It supports the Convention on 
Cybercrime of the Council of Europe, which is not 
an EU institution, and will continue to encourage 
others to sign and ratify the convention, despite 
its flaws.57 The UK is involved with cyber security 
confidence-building measures via the OSCE, which 
include a range of information-sharing and crisis 
management initiatives.58 It was also the initiator 
of the London Process in 2011, which provides 
for the international exchange of views between 
governments, civil society and the private sector.59 
This international role is further underlined by 
the 2018 Commonwealth Cyber Declaration, 
announced in London by Prime Minister May, 
which affirmed the need for international cyber 
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security cooperation across the 53 members of 
the Commonwealth, particularly in the area of 
cybercrime.60 This commitment was bolstered by 
£15 million of additional funding to Commonwealth 
partners to carry out cyber security capacity 
reviews, in addition to the cyber security capacity-
building programme already in place at the Foreign 
Office.61 The tilt towards the Commonwealth may 
indicate a quiet shift towards exploring export 
and influence opportunities afforded by deeper 
cyber security relationships with Commonwealth 
countries. This would also serve to bolster the UK’s 
trade portfolio under the ‘Global Britain’ rubric.62 
Brexit will not affect in principle the dominant 
position of the US in both US–UK and US–EU 
security relations, but it will influence the character 
of these relationships. The UK’s principal security 
partner will continue to be the US and, whether EU 
countries like it or not, the US will persist as their 
key security ally too. In cyber security policy and 
practice, the US is the global leader, and where the 
US goes others tend to follow, albeit sometimes 
reluctantly. Following Brexit, however, might the 
UK lean away from the EU and further towards the 
US to shore up a creaking ‘special relationship’? Will 
it be able to continue acting as a bridge between 
the US and the EU on issues like data protection 
and cyber resilience? Indeed, will the UK be able to 
fulfil this role anyway, if it ceases to be, in the minds 
of both itself and Five Eyes partners (especially 
the US), a gateway to European partners for 
cooperation and insight? And – given the purported 
recent decision by the Cabinet to allow Huawei to 
participate in the UK’s 5G network development, 
albeit at a low level63 – how might this both affect 
its security relationship with a US government 
vociferously opposed to allowing Chinese telecom 
giants to participate in the US domestic market, or 
the UK’s need to form renewed relationships with 
China in a post-Brexit trade construct? 
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In any of these scenarios, the UK will continue to 
have good relationships with most EU countries, with 
shared values and interests, as noted in the Political 
Declaration of 2018. This situation is challenged by 
domestic political forces across Europe, including 
those expressed in Brexit, but there are reasons to be 
optimistic when thinking about future international 
cyber security cooperation and coordination, 
although there will inevitably be some recalibration 
of priorities and activities. Not least, the UK and 
the EU will find common cause in countering active 
cyber threats emanating from states like Russia and 
China – and those states’ cyber diplomacy – and 
perhaps in mitigating a growing rift between the US 
and its transatlantic allies.64 
Conclusion 
As with so much else, the contours of the future 
UK–EU cyber security relationship are contingent on 
the broader political-strategic context, including the 
presence of sufficient goodwill on either side as may 
survive the current state of uncertainty and acrimony. 
The mutual interest in cooperation and collaboration 
will be affected by the conduct and outcome of 
UK–EU negotiations, but too much has already been 
developed – and too much is at stake – to damage 
irreparably, let alone abandon, the close working 
relationships already in place. It is true that many 
aspects of cyber security cooperation will continue 
as they did before, but the UK and the EU will have 
to work harder than ever to maintain the quality of 
those interactions, while others may vanish without 
formal frameworks to sustain them. As outlined 
above, this will be particularly necessary in the fields 
of information sharing and cybercrime, arrangements 
for which may require new legal mechanisms subject 
to the jurisdiction of the ECJ.
Moreover, if the EU and the UK are required to 
negotiate two security treaties – one on ‘internal’ 
police and security matters, the other on ‘external’ 
defence and foreign policy cooperation – how will 
cyber security, which is rooted in both, be dealt with? 
UK government statements on Brexit say little about 
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the role of cyber security as an object or driver of 
defence strategy or foreign policy, and hint instead 
that it would fall under an internal security treaty.65 
This is not unreasonable, but, given the diversity of 
cyber security issues – from cyber threat intelligence 
sharing to cyber defence, cyber resilience, and 
nation-state cyber-enabled information operations – 
there will need to be greater attention to cyber 
security in any forthcoming UK–EU treaty 
negotiations. In the absence of a withdrawal treaty, 
it is likely that at least one defence and security 
treaty will be needed, in which cyber security must 
be addressed by both parties as a strategic priority.
It remains to be seen how Brexit will affect 
the UK’s reputation in defence and security, 
particularly if a withdrawal agreement cannot 
be approved by Parliament. In respect of cyber 
security, for example, will Brexit impact the UK’s 
stated objective to strengthen collective cyber 
security through deepening ‘existing links with 
our closest international partners’?66 Britain’s 
international cyber security networks and working 
relationships will not wither away after Brexit, but it 
is naive to expect they can remain precisely as they 
did before the UK’s exit from the EU. Perhaps what 
is needed is for the UK to rediscover and reassert 
its fabled pragmatism, as a component of what Lord 
Ricketts has called ‘an energetic, active, distinctive 
British foreign policy’.67 Cyber security can play 
its part in promoting this ambition, capitalising on 
its undoubted strengths in this field while at the 
same time recognising where it needs to bolster 
its efforts in respect of its European partners. If, as 
the industry adage has it, ‘cyber security is a team 
sport’, the UK needs to recognise and embrace this 
as a matter of urgency, rather than inadvertently 
damage national cyber security obligations and 
aspirations. n
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